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Glittery Promise vs. Dismal Reality:
The Role of a Criminal Lawyer in the
People's Republic of China after the
1996
Revision
of
the
Criminal
Procedure Law
Ping Yu*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, the Author examines the recent revisions to
the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law. The Author maintains
that while the revisions were intended to promote a more
equitable criminal justice system, the political climate in fact
has rendered the revisions a step down for both defense
attorneys and defendants. The Author analyzes different
aspects of the revised law in order to support this point. In his
conclusion, the Author suggests some changes to the criminal
procedure law that may help to bring the Chinese defense
system up to internationalstandards.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, Chinese lawyers have been characterized as "state
legal workers"' who were supposed to safeguard the interests of the
state instead of their particular client. An independent lawyer who
confronts the state prosecutor is alien to the Confucian tradition.
During the Dynasty period, individuals who aided others in litigation
or advised them in legal matters were treated negatively by the
government and were given the nickname "litigation tricksters" (song
gun).2 Ironically, there was an official recognition of the legitimate
need for legal service, particularly in view of the high rate of illiteracy
in the society.3 While there remained a hostile attitude toward the
legal professional into the Republic era, some changes were made
following efforts to modernize the legal system.
After seizing power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
immediately abolished all Republic of China laws and prohibited the

1.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lushi Zhanxing Tiaoli [Interim Regulations
of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers] art. 1 (1980) (passed by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on Aug. 26, 1980), translated in 19
I.L.M.
1451,
1456, available at http://www.chinalegal.net/databank/lawdata/
eng/c0058.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Interim Regulations on
Lawyers].

2.

Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China: The Past Decade and Beyond, 23

N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751, 751 (1991).
3.
PEERENBOOM, R. P., LAWYERS IN CHINA: OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENCE AND
THE DEFENSE OF RIGHTS 11 (1998).
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practice of the abolished laws by legal professionals. 4 As an
independent profession, lawyers virtually disappeared from society.
In the mid-1950s, however, China began to rehabilitate the legal
system after the enactment of the Constitution 5 and the Organic Law
of People's Courts. 6 The total number of lawyers nationwide in 1995
totaled only eighty-one in twenty-six cities. 7 The number of lawyers
grew rapidly in the following year to 2800.8 The number of bar
associations was nineteen nationwide. 9 With the introduction of the
Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, lawyers were criticized and purged.
Many lawyers were sent to labor camps for re-education because of
their professional role in defending the criminally accused. Until
1959, the government closed all law offices through which lawyers
provided legal services throughout the nation. Again, lawyers
vanished from the normal life of the ordinary Chinese. 10
In the two decades between 1959 and 1980, China did not have
any active lawyers, nor did China have any viable laws to be
practiced by lawyers. The introduction of the Interim Regulations on
Lawyers enacted by the National People's Congress Standing
Committee on August 26, 1980 began the rehabilitation of the role of
lawyers. Chinese lawyers have played an increasingly important role,
initially in the commercial area and then in all aspects of society.,
More specifically, the Lawyers Law of People's Republic of China
(Lawyers Law), which was promulgated in 1996, turned a historical
page for the legal profession." Under the Lawyers Law, a lawyer is
defined as "a professional who provides society with legal service"
(wei shehui tigong falu fuwu de zhiye renyuan) instead of "a state
12
legal worker" (guojia de falu gongzuozhe) as in the old provision.
This change is expected to enable lawyers to work more
independently and to provide legal services more effectively. In

4.

Gelatt, supra note 2, at 753.

5.
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [CONST.] art. 75 (1954), translated
in LIu, SHAO-CHI, REPORT ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA 67, 94 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Constitution]. The first Constitution of the
People's Republic of China ("1954 Constitution") was passed by the National People's
Congress on September 20, 1954. Id. Article 75 of the 1954 Constitution stipulated
that the accused has the right to retain a defender. Id.
6.
[Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China].
The Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China was enacted
on September 28, 1954. Id. Article 7 of the 1954 Organic Law stated: "Apart from
exercisihg self-defense, defendant may retain a lawyer to conduct defense .. " Id.
ZHANG GENG ET AL., ZHONGGUO LUSHI ZHIDU FAZHANG DE LICHENGBEI [A
7.
MILESTONE IN THE PROGRESS OF THE CHINESE LAWYERS SYSTEM] 3 (1997).

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6-8. See also PEERENBOOM, supra note 3, at 15.
For details of the process of drafting the Lawyers Law, see generally ZHANG

GENG ET AL., supra note 7.

12.

Interim Regulations on Lawyers, supra note 1, art. 1.
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addition, the Lawyers Law details the scope of legal services that a
licensed lawyer can provide and ensures that lawyers are protected
by law while performing their legal duties.'3 Lawyers are also legally
required to provide legal aid to indigent people. 14 The Lawyers Law
provides a legal guarantee for the lawyer's practice in a psychological
and arguably a material sense. Overall, the Lawyers Law brings
prosperity to the legal profession. The upsurge of the legal profession
can be seen from its booming numbers. As of May 15, 2001, China
had approximately 117,000 lawyers serving in 9,691 law firms.15
In spite of diverse practice areas, Chinese lawyers were
primarily recognized for their function in criminal proceedings. Not
coincidentally, the rectification of the legal system was initially
focused on the lawyer's role in the criminal process. 16 This public
image was partly reinforced by the official campaign on enhancing
public awareness about the law (puji falu changshi yundong), of
which the publicity of criminal cases and process has been a
prominent feature. Further, the Chinese media coverage of law has
mainly told the story of the criminal trial.
In addition, the revision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in
1996 highlighted the role of the lawyer in the criminal process and
allowed the lawyer to participate in the process as early as the
preliminary stage.' 7 The revised CPL seemingly paved the way for
lawyers to further glorify their career in criminal defense. The 1996
revision also included other reforms such as the procedural
improvement aimed at introducing a more active role for lawyers in
the trial process.
International society and the human rights
watchdogs warmly welcomed these reforms.' 8 It was hoped that
lawyers would play a significant role in the criminal process in terms
of safeguarding the defendant's or suspect's rights and bringing the
criminal trial closer to the internationally recognized standards.
As this Article will demonstrate, however, subsequent
implementation of the CPL has indicated resilient resistance from the

13.
[Lawyers Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 25, 32 (1996)
[hereinafter Lawyers Law]. For the English translation of the Lawyer's Law, see
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA: OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENCE AND THE

DEFENSE OF RIGHTS 111-21 (1998).
14.
Id. art. 42.

15.
See Speech of Mr. Zhang Fusen, Vice-Minister of the Justice, The
Conference on Commemorating Fifth Anniversary of the Lawyer's Law on May 15,
2001 (on file with the author).
16.
Gelatt, supra note 2, at 775.
17.
[Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 96 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 CPL]. For translation of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China (1996), see WEI LUO, THE AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND
THE CRIMINAL COURT RULES
TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION,
18.
JONATHAN HECHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 76

OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH
AND ANNOTATION 78 (2000).
OPENING TO REFORM?: AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED
(1996) [hereinafter OPENING TO REFORM].
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judiciary and law enforcement officers to legal reform. Contrary to
the expectation of the general public, many legal provisions contained
in the CPL with regard to suspect's and defendant's rights have been
ignored or substantially cut short in the process. The resistance is
particularly great regarding certain aspects of the involvement of
lawyers in criminal cases.
As described below, a lawyer's capacity in the early stage of
criminal investigation has been generally impaired. For instance,
lawyers are not able to meet and communicate with clients in custody
and largely fail to collect evidence on their own initiative. After
prosecution, lawyers normally have less access than previously to
case information gathered by the prosecution. Moreover, they can
face criminal penalties for engaging in vigorous defense of their
clients. The role of lawyers in legal defense envisaged in the revised
CPL has been severely diminished by various implementation
measures.
This Article will first review the general situation of lawyers in
criminal proceedings. Then, it will examine a lawyer's practice at
different stages of the criminal process by comparing the 1979
Criminal Procedure Law (1979 CPL) and the CPL. The comparison
will include the investigation stage and the trial phase. It will also
address the critical issue of the lawyer's risk in handling a criminal
case after the revision of the CPL and the Criminal Law. Finally, the
Article will assess the lawyer's role under the CPL reform and will
offer comments about actions that are necessary on the part of the
government in order to improve the overall system and to bring the
Chinese legal system into compliance with the internationally
recognized standard.
The two primary sources of information for this paper are official
Chinese publications and interviews with Chinese legal scholars and
practitioners both inside and outside China. In the past three years,
the legal press and professional periodicals have published a large
number of articles and reports on the implementation of the 1996
CPL. The Author also carried out a series of interviews with Chinese
legal scholars, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and officials of
legislatures in different areas. 19 These interviews provided first hand
information about the implementation of the CPL in some areas. The
Author also used information from observations of several criminal

In total, twelve judges from Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Xi'an, and
19.
Shenzhen were interviewed between the period from 1999 to 2000. The judges
interviewed were selected at random and represent all levels of the Chinese judiciary,
including a judge from the Supreme People's Court. A total of thirty lawyers from
Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, and Xi'an were also interviewed between 1999 and 2000.
In addition, over the same period of time, the Author interviewed a total of around
twenty legal scholars and several prosecutors.
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trials in Beijing and Shanghai that provide details on trial reform.
Finally, the Author collected various official documents, both legally
enacted and internally circulated, that shed light on the real picture
of CPL implementation nationwide as well as in specific localities.

II. THE LAWYER'S FORMAL ROLE AND THE REALITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS

According to the stipulations of the CPL, lawyers can perform
two different functions in the criminal process: provide legal counsel
(falu zixun) and defense representation (daili bianhu). To safeguard
the rights of defendants or suspects, the CPL allows attorneys to
provide legal counseling to individuals being detained or
questioned. 20 In contrast, the old CPL permitted attorneys to be
involved in the process only after the cases were brought before the
courts. 21 After cases are transferred to the prosecutor's office for
prosecution, defendants have the right to hire lawyers to handle their
defense.22 Compared to the old provision, this represents a step
forward. 23 While they are preparing a defense, lawyers can collect
evidence and have the right to check, take note of, and duplicate the
evidence collected by prosecutors. 24 In addition, lawyers have the
right to meet with their clients and maintain communication with
them. 25 More importantly, lawyers have the right to defend their
clients in court trials, including cross-examining witnesses 26 and
27
appealing on behalf of their clients.
The Chinese media, however, has reported that lawyers involved
in defending criminal cases encountered great difficulties when the
CPL first entered into force. 28 Often, during the early stages of
investigation, lawyers could not obtain access to suspects held in
custody by public security departments and procuratorates, although
the CPL authorizes lawyers to meet with criminal suspects if the
suspect so requests. Lawyers were usually required to obtain an
approval from the public security departments or the procuratorate in

20.
1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 96.
21.
[Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 110(2)
(1979), translated in LEXIS Chinalaw No. 40 [hereinafter 1979 CPL].
22.
1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 33.
23.
1979 CPL, supra note 21, art. 110(2). The 1979 CPL provided defense
attorneys with seven-days advance notice for preparing defense. Id.
24.
1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 36.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. art. 156.
27.
Id. art. 180.
28.
Xia Lu, Lushi Xingbian Shisan Nan De Wenti Ji Gaijin [Thirteen
Difficulties that Lawyers Encounter in the Course of CriminalDefense And Suggestions
to Improve], ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE L.], No. 12, at 6 (1997).
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29
order to be able to meet with their clients.
In most cases, lawyers were denied access to suspects either
under the pretext of "state secrets" or for no reason at all. On a few
occasions, lawyers were granted such permission, but their meetings
were held under the direct supervision of the authorities, with the
personnel directly in charge of the investigation (anjian chengban
renyuan) listening in on attorney-client conversations. In preparing
their case, lawyers found it very hard to obtain the necessary
information from prosecutors or to collect evidence on their clients'
behalf.
Frequently, lawyers ran into serious trouble with prosecutors
and public security personnel. In some cases, lawyers have been
detained and even convicted of various crimes for doing nothing more
than vigorously defending their clients and refusing to submit to
official pressure. According to some official reports, the number of
criminal cases represented by a defense lawyer dropped sharply
nationwide after the CPL took effect, a phenomenon that aroused
public concern. According to one authoritative source, lawyers
80
presented a defense in less than thirty percent of criminal cases.
Another commentary indicates that since 1997 close to sixty percent
of criminal cases had no attorney participating. 3 1 This account is
corroborated by official sources, noting that cases with legal defense
account for only thirty percent of all cases tried during the first six
months of 1997.32
Administrative control over lawyers has been strengthened,
Various
particularly during government-sponsored campaigns.
sources indicate that justice departments across the country have
issued executive circulars regulating legal services provided by
lawyers. Most of these documents establish the case reporting system
and approval practices that require lawyers and firms to report
"major or difficult cases" (zhongda yinan anjian) to the local justice
department either for filing or approval purposes. In 1999, the
Beijing Municipal Justice Department formally established a "leading

1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 96. Article 96 stipulates that only those
29.
cases involving state secrets require formal approval from the public security
departments or people's procuratorates for lawyer's meetings with suspects. Id.
Liu Jinxing, Lushi Weihe Buyuan Zuo Xingshi Bianhu? [Why are Lawyers
30.
Unwilling to Defend Criminal Cases], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORATE DAILY], Apr.
7, 1999, at 4. The statistics we obtained from different sources confirm each other.

31.

Gao Qiong, Lushi Yu Xingshi Bianhu [Lawyer and Criminal Defense], in

FAN CHONGYI ET AL., XINGSHI SUSONG FA ZHUANLUN 168 [SPECIAL COMMENTARY ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] (1998).

32.

ZHANG GENG ET AL., ZHONGGUO FALU YUANZHU ZHIDU DANGSHENG DE

QIANQIAN HOUHOU [INS AND OUTS OF THE LEGAL AID SYSTEM COMING INTO BIRTH IN

CHINA] 36 (1998). The chief author is the former Vice-Minister of Justice. Id.
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33
group" within its organizational structure to handle such reports.

This group mainly consists of chief officials from the justice
department. All cases concerning state security as well as those
involving celebrities or high ranking officials above director level (ju
yi shang lingdao ganbu) must be reported. Lawyers handling such
the
cases must report to and abide by decisions, which may 3concern
4
substantive outcome of a case, made by the leading group.
III.

INVOLVEMENT IN THE EARLY STAGE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

The 1996 reform of the Criminal Procedure Law was hailed as
the "most significant legislative development in China's criminal
justice system in nearly 20 years" because it expanded the rights of
criminal suspects and defendants.3 5 According to the CPL, criminal
suspects and defendants can retain legal counsel upon being
questioned or subjected to coercive measures by authorities. 3 6 At this
stage of the proceedings, lawyers may perform the following services:
provide legal advice, petition or complain to authorities on behalf of
their clients, arrange for bail under the provision of "taking a
guarantee and awaiting trial" (qubao houshen), and check with
under which their clients are
authorities on the criminal charges
37
being held in custody or questioned.
Lawyers may also meet with criminal suspects or defendants and
learn the details of their cases from them.38 There is ample evidence,
however, that lawyers have not been able to fulfill their duties for two
reasons. First, the rules issued by public security departments and
prosecutors set up extra restrictions on lawyers meeting with their
Second, individual officers dealing with criminal
clients.
investigations have independently denied lawyers access to their
clients.
A commentary from an author who works for the public security
departments demonstrates why it is so difficult for lawyers to provide
legal counsel at an early stage of the investigation:
The main reasons [for the investigating authority to refuse to allow
the involvement of lawyers] may be summarized as follows:

33.

[The Rules of the Beijing Municipal Justice Department on Reporting

Major Legal Matters by the Beijing Law Offices], JING SI FA No. 7 (1999) (issued on
Jan. 14, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rules on Reporting].
34.
Rules on Reporting, supra note 33, art. 4-6.
35.

OPENING TO REFORM, supra note 18, at 77-79.

36.
1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 50-76. There are altogether five forms of
coercive measures: compulsory summons (juchuan), taking a guarantee and awaiting
trial (qubao houshen), supervised residence (jianshi juzhu), pre-arrest detention
(juliu), and arrest.
Id. art. 96.
37.
38.
Id.
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1.
Lawyers are hired by criminal suspects and regarded as
opponents of the investigating authority; their early involvement is
detrimental to the work of cracking down on the enemy and protecting
the people.
2.
Lawyers provide criminal suspects with legal counsel and legal
aid, which enable suspects to realize and master more knowledge and
skills in self-defense; or [help them] carefully design their statements,
so as to avoid critical issues about the crime and to evade legal
punishment. All of these hinder the investigating authority from
acquiring crucial evidence from the suspect's statement, therefore
creating great difficulty for criminal investigations.
3.
Criminal suspects often refuse to confess or retract their earlier
statement while waiting for the involvement of a lawyer since they
hope to get the lawyer's help.
4.
The (authorities] believe that lawyers may [help suspects]
destroy or conceal evidence after meeting with suspects and learning
the details of their cases, which will cause extra trouble for the
39
criminal investigation.

With such an official mentality, the current situation regarding the
early involvement of lawyers in the criminal process can only be
described as miserable.
A. Lawyers Need Approval for Meeting Clients
According to official investigations, post CPL working conditions
for defense attorneys were disheartening. A survey by All China
Lawyers Association (ACLA) undertaken from March to April 1997
found that lawyers were commonly limited or even flatly denied
access to their clients. 40 In Huangshi City, Hubei Province, lawyers
from fifteen law firms accepted 108 cases in which legal counsel was
requested. Lawyers, however, managed to meet with their clients in
only thirty of these cases. One law firm working on seven cases was
41
not allowed a single meeting between its lawyers and their clients.
In one province, during the period from January 1, 1997-the date
the CPL entered into force-to the beginning of 1998, authorities
42
allowed only four requests of lawyers to meet with their clients.

39.
Wang Longtian, Zhengcha Jiguan Jujue Lushi Jieru Zhengcha Huodong
De Sikao [Thoughts on the Refusal of Crime Investigation Authorities to Permit the
Involvement of Lawyers in Crime Investigation Activities], GONGAN DAXUE XUEBAO [J.
PUB. SECURITY U.] No.2, at 82-83 (1998).
40.
Wang Ningjiang, Lushi Tiqian Jieru Zaoyu Kunnan [Lawyer's Early
Involvement EncounteringDifficulties], MINZHU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND L.], No.
19, at 18 (1997).
41.
Id.
42.
Cui Min, Xingshi Susongfa Shishi Zhong De Wenti Yu Jianyi [Problems
and Suggestions That Have Occurred in Implementation of the Criminal Procedure
Law], XIANDAI FAXUE [MOD. JURISPRUDENCE], No.1, at 19 (1998).
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Many complaints have charged that lawyers were denied
meetings with their clients under the pretext that the case involved
"state secrets." According to the CPL, "state secrets" cases require
43
lawyers to obtain approval to meet with their imprisoned clients.
The CPL, however, does not define the concept of "state secrets."
Other regulations concerning state secrets also fail to provide a clear
definition of this concept. Thus, public security departments and
procuratorates have a convenient tool for preventing lawyers from
having contact with their clients.
Specifically, Item 6, Article 8 of the Law on Preservation of State
Secrets of the People's Republic of China (State Secrets) specifically
stipulates that details of the investigation of crimes are to be
protected as "state secrets." 44 In addition, a Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) regulation states that all details of criminal
investigations should be considered state secrets. 45 Under this
provision, almost all criminal cases under investigation could be
construed as involving "state secrets," and therefore advance approval
for meetings between lawyers and their clients in official custody can
be required. It is not clear to the extent that such excuses are being
used on a nationwide basis to refuse requests from lawyers for such
meetings. One article indicated that from January to March 1997, a
lawyer was allowed to see the suspect during the investigation period
in only one out of the forty-two cases handled by an intermediate
court in Henan Province. 46 On at least one occasion, officials
admitted that some public security departments were denying all
requests from lawyers for meetings with their clients on a "state
secrets" basis. 47 Another report said that, during the first five
months of the CPL's implementation, lawyers in one city were denied
meetings with their clients in sixty percent of all criminal cases. 48 In

1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 96.
43.
44.
[The People's Republic of China Law on Preservation of State Secrets], art.
8, § 6 (1988). The People's Republic of China Law on Preservation of State Secrets
was promulgated by the National People's Congress in 1988.
45.
Gongan Gongzuo Zhong Guojia Mimi Jiqi Miji Juti Fangwei De Guiding
[The Rules on State Secrets and It Detailed Ranking Scopes Involving Public Security
Work], art. 2(C)-11 (1989) (issued by the Ministry of Public Security on Oct. 17, 1989).
Article 2(C)-11 states that all details of criminal cases under investigation should be
considered "state secrets." Id.
Zhou Guojun, Zhengque Renshi Lushi Yu Bei Zhuisuzhe De Guanxi
46.
Baozhang Lushi De Susong Quanli [Correctly Appreciating the Relationship between
Lawyers and the Accused and Guaranteeing Lawyer's Rights to Participate in Legal
Action], ZHENGFA LUNTAN [POL. AND L. F.], No. 5, at 66 (1997).
Guo Guanghua, Gonganbu Yaoqiu Geji Gongan Jiguan Jianjue Baozhang
47.
Lushi Tiqian Jieru [The Ministry of Public Security Requests that All Public Security
Departments Strictly Guarantee Lawyers' Early Involvement in Criminal Cases],
RENMIN GONGAN [PEOPLE'S PUB. SECURITY], No. 4, at 10 (1999).

48.
Shao Jianping, Qianxi Lushi Tiqian Jieru Yu Guojia Mimi De Guanxi
[Brief Analysis of Relationship between 'State Secrets' and Lawyers' Early
Involvement], DANGDAI SIFA [CONTEMP. JUDICIARY], No. 2, at 35 (1999).
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some cities, the percentage of such cases in which access was denied
under the state secrets clause was close to ninety percent of all
criminal cases. 49 A lawyer complained that since the CPL entered
50
into force, he has never had the chance to meet with his clients.
Interviews with Chinese lawyers and scholars reveal a concern
that local officials have tended to treat all details concerning the
investigation of crimes as state secrets. 51 Therefore, in practice, any
meeting with a criminal suspect under investigation requires formal
approval from the authorities. 52 Apparently during the first six
months of the CPL, requests from lawyers for meetings with clients in
53
custody were generally denied under the state secrets rubric.
Ironically, even minor crimes such as reckless driving can be
54
considered to involve state secrets.
By other occasions, a lawyer's requests to visit his or her clients
have been rejected for no reason at all. Some reports said that public
security departments give no explanation when they decline to grant
lawyers' applications to visit. In a few situations, lawyers were told
that public security departments were too busy to make any
arrangements for such meetings. In at least two cases, lawyers were
informed that suspects did not want to see them and were given no
55
chance to speak with the suspects themselves.

49.
Lushi Canyu Xingsu Jiangsu You Xin Changshi [Report: New Practice of
Jiangsu Province for Lawyers' Participationin Criminal Litigation], RENMIN GONGAN
[PEOPLE'S PUB. SECURITY], No. 17, at 15 (1997).
50.
Wang Guangjing & Wang Longtian, Lushi Tiqian Jieru De Xianzhuang Ji
Sikao [The Current Situation and Thoughts on Lawyers' 'Early Involvement], MINZHU
YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND L.], No. 5,-at 30 (1998).
51.
Interviews with lawyers and scholars in Shanghai, Xi'an, Wuhan, Beijing,
and Anqing (on file with author).
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Zou Gaoxiang et al., Zhengcha Jieduan Jieru Yi Ge Ling Lushi Ganga De
Huati [Early Involvement in the Stage of Criminal Investigation: An Embarrassing
Topic for Lawyers], NANFANG DUSHI BAO, [S. URB. DAILY], Aug. 29, 1998, at 21
[hereinafter Early Involvement].
55.
In Shanghai, a lawyer told us that he was informed that the suspect
declined to see him though he had secured a document from his client long before.
The authorities did not give him a chance to check with his client. Supra note 51. In
another case in Xiamen, Fujian Province, the lawyer was informed that the suspect
was unwilling to meet with him after he had been retained by the suspect's family and
worked on arranging a meeting for more than a month. Id. Mu Liancai, Dui Lushi
Caiyu Xingshi Susong Zhiye Huangjing De Sikao [Thoughts on the Environment in
Which Lawyers are PracticingCriminal Procedure Law], ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE
LAW.], No. 12, at 10 (1997).
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B. Limitation on Number and Durationof Meetings Between Lawyers
and Clients
Even if they are allowed to meet with their clients during the
investigatory phase, various restrictions have limited the legal
services lawyers can effectively provide. Indeed, the regulatory
environment sometimes renders attorney-client meetings virtually
meaningless.
Prior to the CPL coming into effect, the MPS drafted
implementation rules 56 stating that meetings between lawyers and
suspects, if approved, should ordinarily involve a one-time visit
lasting no longer than thirty minutes. 57 The rules further specify
that such meetings should not be permitted more than twice.5 8 Many
authorities, including the public security departments and
procuratorates, have reportedly enacted similar rules limiting the
number and duration of meetings. In Guizhou, regulations set an
even shorter duration for lawyer-client meetings to between ten and
twenty minutes, while sometimes meetings were to be limited to only
five minutes. 59 The provincial public security departments in
Shandong and Zhejiang restricted meetings to a one-time
consultation lasting no more than thirty minutes.60 In accordance

56.
Lushi Canyu Xingshi Susong Zangxing Guiding [Interim Rules on
Lawyers' Participation in Criminal Litigation], art. 10 [hereinafter MPS Interim
Rules].
Article 10 states:
Upon request by a crime suspect and approval by the public security
department, a lawyer may meet with him or her once and no more than twice
if the circumstances of the case is complicated. The date and place of meeting
shall be decided by the authorities investigating the crime, and each meeting
shall last no longer than 30 minutes.
Id. See Xingshi Bianhu Goujian Sifa Gongzheng Dasha Buke Queshao De Zhizhu
[Report on the Symposium "Criminal Defense: Indispensable Pillars for Building
Judicial Justice System'], ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE LAw.] No. 15, at 18 (1998)
[hereinafter Symposium].
The MPS Interim Rules were widely circulated for
solicitation of opinions within the public security system. Id. Most local public
security departments made their own rules modeled on these draft trial rules, though
the formal MSP Trial Rules dropped the time limits later on when it was issued on
December 20, 1996. Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. See FAN CHONGYI ET AL., XINGSHI SUSONG FA ZHUANLUN [SPECIAL
COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAw] 168 (1998).
59.
Wang Ningjiang, Lushi Tiqian Jieru Zaoyu Kunnan [Lawyer's Early
Involvement EncounteringDifficulties], MINZHU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND L.], No. 19
(1997).
60.
See Xiao Zhou, Xingsufa Sifa Jieshi Yu Lushi Susong Quanli Baozhang
[On Guaranteeingthe Rights of Lawyers in Litigation And the Criminal Procedure
Law And the JudicialInterpretations], ZONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA JURISPRUDENCE], No.
1, at 132 (1999). See also Wang Shujing, Lushifa Shishi Hou Jidai Jiejue De Jige
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with a document jointly issued by several judicial authorities in Xi'an,
Shanxi Province, lawyers could only meet with imprisoned suspects
once and for no more than one hour. 6 1 It was reported that most
public security departments imposed limits on the number and
duration of meetings either by enacting formal detailed rules or
through issuing internally circulated notices.
Although the SPP's Trial Rules did not spell out any limit on the
number and duration of lawyers meetings with their clients in its
custody, most local procuratorates in fact followed the exact same
rules as the public security departments. 62 One report revealed that
in early 1997, the courts imposed the same type of restrictions on
entered
meetings between lawyers and defendants even after cases
63
into the trial stage, which is in direct violation of the CPL.
C. Conditions of Meetings with Suspects
Often characterized as an official right to "be present" at the
lawyer-chent meeting (huijian zaichang quan), officials insist on
being present during meetings between lawyers and suspects. Most
officials attending such meetings are those in charge of the criminal
investigation in question. 64 Their presence naturally has a direct
impact on the nature of the conversation. Moreover, some local
officials installed video cameras or tape recorders to monitor the
conversation between lawyers and suspects. 6 5 Lawyers and scholars
also complain of the official practice of warning, "educating," and even

Wenti [Several Urgent Issues That Need to Be Solved Following the Lawyers Law
Coming Into Effect], ZHONGGUO LUSHI BAO [CHINESE LAW. NEWSPAPER], May 24, 1997,

at 3.
See Xi'an Shi Renmin Jianchayuan Xian Shi Zongji Renmin Fayuan Xian
61.
Shi Gongganju Xianshi Sifaju Guanyu Shishi Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi
Susongfa Ruogan Yijian Shixing [The Several Opinions of the People's Procuratorate,
the Intermediate People's Court, the Bureau of Public Security, and the Bureau of
Justice of Xi'an on Implementing the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic
of China], issued on Feb. 28, 1997.
62.
Article 127 of the fourth Draft of the SPP's Trial Rules and Article 130 of
the Fifth Draft of the SPP's Trial Rules (for discussion) stipulated the same two visit
rule and thirty minute duration. The final version of the SPP's Trial Rules, however,
dropped these clauses and left the matter to the discretion of the people's
procuratorates.
See Xingshi Bianhu Goujian Sifa Gongzheng Dasha Buke Queshao De
63.
Zhizhu [The Report on the Symposium on Criminal Defense: Indispensable Pillars for
Building Judicial Justice System], ZONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE LAW.], No.15, at 19
(1998) [hereinafter Symposium]. See also 1996 CPL, supranote 17, art. 36 (specifying
that lawyers may meet and maintain correspondence with defendants, while other
defense representatives (qita bianhuren) need approval from the courts to meet with
defendants). See also Lawyers Law, supra note 13, art. 30.
See interviews cited supra note 19.
64.
See Ningjiang, supra note 40.
65.
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intimidating suspects in front of their lawyers before the meeting
begins. Some investigative authorities even suggest that officials
should take advantage of such meetings to crack cases or obtain
66
statements from suspects or defendants.
In some localities, lawyers met with their clients under
outrageous conditions. Detention centers generally do not provide
sufficient space for lawyers to meet with detainees, and sometimes
this shortage resulted in lawyers lining up to meet with suspects. For
instance, in Changsha Number One Detention Center, there is only
one visiting room for legal consultations in a center with a population
of over a thousand detainees. 67 It is common that two meetings are
held simultaneously in the same room. 6 8 In Shiyan City, Hubei
Province, meetings are held in an outside yard. 69 And in Xiangyang,
there is a glass screen separating lawyers from suspects with a hole
in the middle of the glass.7 0 Both sides have to speak loudly to make
themselves heard. 1 One of the worst places is E'zhou, where lawyers
and suspects meet in a metal cage without any chairs inside it. 72 This
arrangement makes it convenient for officials to monitor the
conversation. Under such circumstances, lawyers are not likely to
73
have long consultations with their clients.
The authorities often attempt to censor the content of
Some
conversations between lawyers and suspects in advance.
officials told lawyers they were only permitted to know with what
suspects had been charged. 7 4 Other officials insisted that any inquiry
about details of the case concerned would jeopardize the official
criminal investigation. 75 To ensure that lawyer-client meetings
would not damage the investigation, some officials required the
lawyer to submit a written account of what they planned to talk about
before holding a conversation with a suspect.7 6 The officials would
also require that the meeting be carried out exactly according to the
77
written talking points.

66.

Guo Ziaobin, Lun Xin Xingshi Susongfa Shishi Hou Xingshi Zhengcha

Gongzuo De Gaige Yu Fazhang), [On Reform and Development of Work of Crime
Investigation After the New Criminal Procedure Law Took Effect] XIGZHENG YANJIU
(Study of Crime Investigation), No. 1, 1998, at 11.
67.
See Deng Ruixiang, Tiqian Jieru, Moheqi Yi Guo [Early Involvement:
Gearing-Up Time Is Over], RENMIN GONGAN [PEOPLE'S PUB. SECURITY], No. 4, at 8

(1999).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ningiang, supra note 40.
See Interview with lawyers in Shanghai and Beijing (Apr. 1999).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 19.
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In many detention centers, lawyers are given the responsibility
of maintaining security and are required to bring a pair of handcuffs
to put on the suspect during their meetings. 78 Furthermore,
authorities take every opportunity to charge unreasonable fees for
a
everything from the purchase of application forms-to apply for
79
meeting or for bail-to making photocopies of various documents.
Some official public commentary on the work of lawyers during
the criminal investigation phase further discounts the quality of the
legal services provided. One commentator from the Public Security
Department of Zhejiang Province writes:
Several points need to be noted [by the investigating authority] on
answering questions from lawyers:
1.
Answers [to the lawyer's questions] should be always given by
concealing in full the real direction of the crime investigation
80
concerned;
2.
Answers should only touch on the charges but not give any
details of the facts, witnesses, documentary evidence, physical
evidence, as well as other evidentiary materials;
3.
[Investigation personnel] should not answer
related to the facts or charges yet to be verified.8 1

any question

Another official from the public security department of Jiangsu
Province even more openly lays out prohibitions for lawyers:
"Lawyers are prohibited from holding private meetings with suspects
... from learning the details of the whole case.., from investigating
or collecting evidence from others... from participating in official
' 82
questioning of suspects.
D. PretrialRelease: Taking A Guarantee and Awaiting Trial
Although it is legally possible, lawyers rarely succeed in bailing

78.
Zhou Guojun, Zhengque Renshi Lushi Yu Bei Zhuisuzhe De Guanxi
Baozhang Lushi De Susong Quanli [Correctly Appreciating the Relationship between
Lawyers and the Accused and Guaranteeing Lawyer's Rights to Participate in Legal
Action], ZHENGFA LUNTAN [POL. AND L. F.], No. 5, at 12 (1997).
79.
See Xia Lu, supra note 28, at 6.
80.
In other words, officials should not make any indications that would allow
lawyers and suspects from knowing anything regarding the stage of the investigation
which would facilitate preparation of defense strategies.
81.
Yuan Zhongmin, Shi Lun Gongan Jiguan Zai Zhengcha Jieduan Du Lushi
De Jiedai [Brief Points on the Public Security Department'sHandlingof Lawyers at the
Stage of Crime Investigation], XINGZHEN YANJIU [STUDY OF CRIM. INVESTIGATION], No.
1, at 15 (1998).
82.
Yang Zongzheng and Xue Hongwei, Guanyu Lushi Jieru Zhengeha Jiege
Wenti De Sikao [Thoughts on Several Issues of Lawyers' Early Involvement in Crime
Investigation], GONGAN DAXUE XUEBAO [J. OF PUB. SECURITY U.], No. 1, at 37 (1997).
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out their clients during the criminal investigation period.8 3 The CPL
allows lawyers to start the process of applying for "taking a guarantee
and awaiting trial" (qubao houshen) after the formal arrest of a
suspect is ordered. 84 Article 51 of the CPL stipulates:
People's courts, people's procuratorates, as well as public security
departments may, under the followings circumstances, put a defendant
or suspect under the measures of taking a guarantee and awaiting trial
or supervised residence:
1.

the defendant or suspect may be sentenced to control, criminal
detention or a supplementary penalty;

2.

the defendant or suspect may be sentenced to a fix-term
imprisonment but his or her release on either measures will not
pose a threat to the society.

Measures of taking a guarantee and awaiting trial or supervised
85
residence is carried out by the public security departments.

Article 52 specifically allows defendants or suspects themselves
to apply or their legal counsels, legal guardians, and their family
86
members to apply on their behalf for such measures.
A lawyer's petition for taking a guarantee and awaiting trial,
however, is either quickly dismissed or left forever pending. There
have been only a very few occasions in which lawyers managed, after
a long painful process, to get their clients out on bail under this
measure. One commentator claimed that to his knowledge not a
single application for bailing out suspects had been granted by the
people's procuratorates since the 1996 reforms. 8 7 In fact, pretrial
release is an exception in China, which clearly conflicts with
international standards on pretrial detention. 8
The lawyers and legal scholars interviewed for this report
complained that provisions concerning taking a guarantee and
awaiting trial are often rendered meaningless. 89 In practice, there is
no set standard for deciding whether or not to grant such a request.
This allows the determination to be made on an arbitrary basis.
Among the small number of people released awaiting trial, very few
gain release as a result of a lawyer's application or a request from the
suspect.
Most suspects are released on the initiative of the
authorities. 90 Though the CPL stipulates the conditions for taking a

83.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 36.
84.
Id.
85.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 51.
86.
Id. art. 52.
87.
See Symposium, supra note 63, at 17.
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
88.
9(3), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("[It'shall not be a general rule that persons awaiting trial
shall be detained in custody .....
89.
See supra note 19.
90.
Id.
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guarantee and awaiting trial, public security departments and
procuratorates usually do not consider a pre-trial release unless such
a release becomes absolutely necessary. 91
According to a Shanghai lawyer, public security departments
consider the release of a suspect in only two situations: if the public
security departments will exceed the time limit for pretrial detention
or if the offenses in question are so minor that suspects are unlikely
to be sentenced to any jail term. 92 Procuratorates are even more
reluctant to release suspects. In the overwhelming majority of
93
situations, suspects are not released until the investigation is over.
Prosecutors claim that all cases investigated by them are either so
complicated or serious that it is inappropriate to release suspects
before the investigation is complete. 94 This statement explains why
lawyers are unable to gain the release of their clients during the
criminal investigation period when cases are handled by
95
prosecutors.
E. Joint Provisionsby the Six Central Departments
Due to concerns about the deteriorating environment for lawyers
engaged in criminal defense, particularly at the early stage of
criminal investigations, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) coordinated a
joint interpretation of the CPL. Although many agreed that the
various judicial interpretations have greatly diminished their ability
to represent defendants, it was not until January 19, 1998, that the
Joint Provisions were enacted. 96 The fact that the six central
departments, including all major players in the implementation of the
CPL, jointly interpreted a major law is an unprecedented event. The
joint interpretation reflects a struggle for power and control among
departments rather than a well-reasoned judicial consideration.
Major corrections in the Joint Provisions include clarifying the
concept of "state secrets," setting time limits for approval of
applications for lawyers to visit clients in cases involving state
97
secrets, and stipulating the rights of defendants in a clearer way.
Nevertheless, the discretion of the authorities to handle the
practicalities of visits by lawyers was left largely untouched.

91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
See Xue Chunxi & Zhao Jianji, Tongyi Guize Lushi Canyu Xingshi Susong
Do Xing Fabao [Uniform Rules: New Magic Weapon for Lawyers to Participate in
Criminal Litigation], ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE L.], No. 4, at 40-43. See also
ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE L.], No. 5, at 37-39 (1998).
97.
Id.

844

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:827

It has been reported that the situation of lawyers representing
their clients has somewhat improved. There is no evidence, however,
that there have been any major changes in this regard following the
joint interpretation. As one report shows, lawyers were not positive
about the new provisions because the reality they face does not even
come close to the requirements set forth in the Joint Provisions.9"
The lawyers and legal scholars interviewed for this report
generally believe that any reforms will be ineffective unless the
criminal process is made public and the CPL or relevant judicial
interpretations clearly lay out the rights of suspects and defendants. 99
As long as the judicial authorities, such as the public security
departments and the procuratorates, maintain enormous discretion,
there will be little room for improvement. 10 0
F. Legal Defense
Lawyers who are retained by suspects or defendants have a duty
to defend their clients.
The CPL requires that the people's
procuratorates notify suspects or defendants of their right to hire a
lawyer within three days after the procuratorates receive cases from
the public security departments to review for prosecution. 1 1 At this
point, defense lawyers should have access to certain case materials
collected by the prosecution. 10 2 Compared to the old provisions, this
1 3
change allows lawyers a much longer time to prepare their defense. 0
Both the CPL and the Lawyers Law specify that lawyers have
10 4
the right to collect evidence about the case on their own initiative.
After the case is transferred to the courts for trial, lawyers are
allowed access to certain materials about the case held by the
authorities.' 0 5 During trial, lawyers can cross-examine witnesses,
review the evidence presented by prosecutors, 10 6 and conduct a legal
07
defense on behalf of defendants.
In practice, however, lawyers frequently encounter obstacles in
presenting a proper defense for their clients. These obstacles include:
restricted access to evidence collected by prosecutors, insufficient
power to collect evidence, and inability to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses who have provided testimony but who do not appear in

98.
See Zou Gaoxiang, Early Involvement, supra note 54, at 21.
99.
See supra note 19.
100.
Id.
101.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17.
102.
Id.
103.
See 1979 CPL, supra note 21, art. 110 (3) (requiring only that the court
notify the defendants of the rights to retain a lawyer at least seven days before trial).
104.
See Symposium, supra note 71; 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 37.
105.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17.
106.
Id.
107.
See id. art. 157.
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court. 10 8 These issues will be examined in detail below.
1. Access to Evidence Collected by Authorities
Defendants and their legal counsel encounter more difficulties in
accessing prosecutorial evidence after the CPL revision. Overall, the
new barrier to evidence greatly weakens the attorney's ability to
prepare an effective defense.
The CPL's formulation of what case materials defense attorneys
should be allowed to access is ambiguous. It states that in order to
prepare their defense, lawyers have the right to "look up, make
excerpts from and duplicate litigation documents and technical
documents" in the prosecutors' files, after the case is transferred to
the procuratorate by the police for "review for prosecution" (shencha
qisu).10 9 The CPL, however, does not clearly define such terms as
"litigation documents" or "technical authentication documents."
The lacuna of evidence leaves authorities with broad discretion
to hold back evidence from lawyers. Some commentators insist that
all the major evidence related to the case should be included in the
category of litigation documents, and therefore be accessible to
lawyers. 110 In practice, however, lawyers have not been able to
examine any of the evidence collected by the public security
departments or the people's procuratorates. Furthermore, judicial
interpretation on what constitutes "litigation documents" has firmly
shut out defense lawyers from discovery of official evidence during
the prosecution's review of the case. 111 According to the SPP Rules:
Litigation documents refer to those legal litigation documents made
specifically for filing for investigation, taking coercive measures,
determining investigation methods, as well as initiating the
prosecution review process, such as the document on filing for
investigation (lian jueding shu), detention order (juliu zheng), the
document approving arrest (pizhun daibu jueding shu), the document
deciding arrest (daibu jueding shu), the arrest warrant (daibu zheng),
112
and the opinion on prosecution of the crime (qisu yijian shu).

Moreover,

an official

SPP commentary

expressly prohibits

108.
See supra note 19.
109.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17.
110.
See Li Baoyue, Zai Lun Bianhu Lushi De Yuejuan Quan [Commenting
Again on Defense Lawyers' Right to Access Official Files], in XINGSHI SUSONG FA
ZHUANLUN [SPECIAL COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 161063 (Fang
Chongyi et al., 1998) (1998).
111.
[Supreme People's Procuratorate Rules on the Criminal Process for
People's Procuratorates] issued on Dec. 16, 1998, art. 319.
112.
Id.
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lawyers from accessing any of the evidence relating to a case. 113 The
commentary states that "defenders can only look at the technical
documents (jishu xing ziliao) and cannot examine the physical
evidence, documentary evidence, witness testimony, victim's
statement, defendant's statement or self-defense statement and other
evidentiary materials such as crime-scene records and technical
14
records."
The CPL only requires that, after cases are transferred to the
court for trial, prosecutors provide courts with a list of the evidence
and of the witnesses and with copies of "major evidence." 115 By
contrast, under the old CPL, prosecutors had to submit to the courts
all evidence and related materials along with the indictment. If they
did not do so, prosecutors ran the risk of the court deciding that the
case should be dismissed or returned to the procuratorate for
supplementary investigation. 116 This revision in the CPL was part of
a larger trial process reform that prohibits judges from reviewing the
substance of cases before trial. 117 Instead, the reform promoted
judges to decide cases based on both sides' presentations. The reform
has greatly weakened the defendant's position at the trial stage,
without some measures to balance the power of the prosecution, such
as a mandatory discovery process.
The possibility that the "reform" would have such an outcome
was not unforeseen. One commentator warned three years ago: "The
fact that prosecutors are only required to submit to the courts a list of
the evidence and the litigation documents will have a negative effect
on the right of defendants to discovery. This will definitely hinder

113.
See ZHANG QIONG ET AL., RENMIN JIANCHAYUAN XINGSHI SUSONG LILUN YU
SHIWU
[THEORY
AND PRACTICE
OF
CRIIMINAL
PROCEDURE FOR PEOPLE'S
PROCURATORATEs] 84-85 (1997).

114.
Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa De
Jueding Xuexi Gangyao [The SPP Study Department of Law and Policy: Study
Guideline on the Decision to Revise the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China] at 207 (1996).
115.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17.
116.
See 1979 CPL, supra note 21, art. 108
After reviewing the cases submitted for public prosecution, the people's courts
shall decide to hear those cases if the facts of the case are clear and the
evidence is sufficient [to prove a crime has been committed by the defendant];
with regard to those cases in which major facts are unclear and the evidence is
not sufficient, [the people's court] may return them to the people's
procuratorate for a supplementary investigation; as to those cases that do not
merit a sentence, [the people's court] may request that the people's
procuratorate withdraw the prosecution.
Id. This provision forced prosecutors to submit all available evidence in order to avoid
cases being returned for supplementary investigation or dismissed.
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defendants and their defenders from preparing a defense."" 8
Many lawyers report that the rule prohibiting prosecutors from
submitting their evidence to the courts effectively nullifies the right
of lawyers to look at the documents and the evidence held by the
authorities. 119 It is a common practice for prosecutors to deliberately
withhold evidence from defendants during the prosecution review
stage (shencha qisu jieduan) as well as during the trial phase
(shenpanjieduan).120
Thus, lawyers are unable to obtain useful information at the
prosecution review stage. When the case reaches court, defense
lawyers are only allowed to look at the files deposited with the
court, 12 1 which generally contain little more than what they have
seen at the earlier phases. Lawyers are thus left in the dark in the
defense preparation.
Considering that prosecutors have a disproportionate advantage
in collecting evidence and that lawyers are given a short time period
to prepare their defense, many scholars insist on the adoption of a
discovery process that would allow greater access to evidence. The
discovery process would include access to all evidence collected by
prosecutors and public security departments and all evidence that
would be presented at trial. 122 In some localities, experimental
discovery procedures under the sponsorship of the courts have been
reported.
For instance, Yantai People's Intermediate Court
experimented with this system and allowed defense lawyers to access
the prosecution's evidence. Prosecutors were obviously critical of this
experiment. 123
There is no sign, however, that the Chinese

117.
See HECHT, supra note 18, at 55.
118.
See Wang Minyuan, Woguo Xongshi Susongfa Xiugai Shuping [Comments
And Description of the Criminal Procedure Law Revision of Our Country], FAXUE JIA
[JURISTS], at 50 (1996).
119.
See supra note 19.
120.

Id.

121.
Although the CPL does not specify what materials lawyers can have access
to during the trial stage, judges and prosecutors universally assume that lawyers can
only look at, excerpt from, as well as duplicate the materials deposited with the courts,
obviously excluding any possibility of checking on materials held by the prosecutor's
office. Some commentators suggest that the law should require that lawyers have
access to prosecution evidence which has not been submitted to the courts. See Li Yin,
Shi Lun Xianxing Xingshi Zhengju Zhidu De Li/a Quexian Ji Wangshan [On the
Legislative Flaws and Improvements of the Current System of Criminal Evidence],
LEGAL Sci. No. 1, at 123 (1999). See also Wang Minyuan and Zhu Changli, General
Commentary on Study of the Criminal Procedure Law, CASS J. L.. No. 1, at 145-46
(1999) (summarizing generally the scholarly discussion of the discovery system).
122.
Id. Discovery system is also translated as "xianxi zhidu," which means
"advancedknowledge (of the evidence)."
123.
See Ji You Duikang You You He Zuo Kongbian Shuanfang Tingqian Shidu
Jiechu Yantai Changshi Zhengju Kaishi [Confrontation as Well as Cooperation,
Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers Get in Touch before Trial. Yantai Experiment
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authorities will formally establish a discovery system anytime in the
near future.
2. Limitations on the Rights of Lawyers to Collect Evidence
Another significant change in the CPL is that the right of
lawyers to collect their own evidence is severely impaired. According
to the CPL, lawyers may collect evidence from witnesses, units (dan
wei) or other individuals only with their consent. Furthermore,

lawyers must obtain permission from the people's procuratorates or
the courts in order to collect evidence from victims or witnesses
provided by victims.

124

In addition, the evidence requirements represent a setback in the
lawyer's ability to prepare a case. Although the old CPL did not
elaborate on the power of lawyers to collect evidence, the Interim
Regulations on Lawyers provided some guarantees on collecting
evidence.125 Article 7 of the Interim Regulations stipulated:
In legal proceedings, lawyers shall have the right to consult the
materials of the case and make enquires from organizations and
persons concerned in accordance with relevant regulations. When
acting as defenders in criminal cases, lawyers may meet and
correspond with defendants held in custody. Lawyers may meet and
maintain correspondence with defendants in custody.
The organizations and persons concerned shall have the duty to render
assistance to the lawyers engaged in the activities mentioned in the
126
preceding paragraph.

Some local regulations also provided lawyers with safeguards for
securing evidence. For instance, a Shanghai regulation, promulgated
in 1995, provided:
Lawyers shall present a letter of introduction from their law office and
a lawyer's license while investigating and collecting evidentiary
materials relating to the legal matter or cases in question from units
and individuals. Unless law or regulations stipulate otherwise, those
units or individuals shall assist lawyers and provide them with the
127
relevant materials.

Some may argue that individuals or institutions are not legally
obliged to cooperate with lawyers in many other criminal justice
systems, especially litigation adversaries. Considering that Chinese
lawyers lack access to officially-collected evidentiary materials and

'Discovery of Evidence 1, PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE DAILY, Dec. 22, 1999, available at
http://www.jcrb.com/html/1999/12/22/e19991222_Ol.htm
124.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 37.
125.
See Interim Regulations on Lawyers, supra note 1, art. 7.
126.

Id.

127.
Shanghai Lushi Guanli Banfa [Article 28 of the Practice on Management of
Lawyers in Shanghai], issued by People's Municipal Government of Shanghai, on
December 23, 1994 and entered into force on February 1, 1995 (on file with author).
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are unable to summon witnesses to testify in court, however, this

revision has undoubtedly further diminished the ability of lawyers to
effectively represent their clients at trial.
An alternative for lawyers seeking favorable evidence is to apply
for a court order to secure the evidence in question. Under the CPL,
lawyers may apply to the court requesting the collection of certain
evidence should they believe that the evidence in question is critical
to the case and they are not able to obtain it on their own. 128 Courts,
however, often dismiss such applications by ruling that the evidence
in question is unnecessary or insignificant. 1 29 There is no recourse
for lawyers if a court decides to reject their application for an official
collection of evidence. Prior to the enactment of the Joint Provisions
on January 19, 1998, such applications from lawyers often failed. In
most cases, the courts indiscriminately dismissed such applications.
In other cases, the courts issued lawyers with permission to
investigate (zhunxu diaocha zheng) and let them collect the evidence
on their own. This practice directly contravened the CPL, which
requires that the court itself collect evidence if a lawyer's application
has been granted. 13 0 There has been no improvement despite the
Joint Provisions' requirement that the courts abide by the CPL and
collect the evidence on the lawyer's behalf if they decide it is
13
necessary to do so. 1
Under these circumstances, the defense mainly consists only of
questioning and rebutting the evidence presented by prosecutors.
This generally makes for a weak defense and results in inadequate
Some
consideration by the courts of the lawyers' efforts.
commentators have partly attributed the ineffectiveness of defense
132
lawyers to difficulties in collecting evidence.
3. Difficulties in Calling Witnesses and Cross-examining Evidence at
Trial
Because lawyers have insufficient access to prosecution evidence
and lack the means to collect their own evidence, lawyers must have
an opportunity to examine the evidence presented during trial.

128.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 37.
129.
See supra note 19.
130.
See 1996 CPL, supranote 17, art. 37.
131.
Article 15 of the Joint Provisions requires that the courts and
procuratorates collect evidence upon request from lawyers, given that courts or
procuratorates believe it "necessary." This provision leaves discretion to the courts or
procuratorates to decide if they should collect evidence requested by lawyers.
Wang Weiping, Xingshi Shenpan Hushi Lushi Bianhu Yijian De Yuanyin
132.
Ji Duice [The Reasons and Counter-strategies of Lawyers' Defense Opinions Being
Overlooked in Criminal Trials], SHANXI SHIDA XUEBAO [J. SHANXI NORMAL U.], No. 4,
at 5-6 (1997).
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Lawyers, however, have great difficulty in calling witnesses to testify
on the stand.
The absence of witnesses during trial has been a long-standing
problem in criminal cases in China. Prior to the enactment of the
new CPL, witnesses were rarely called to the stand, and defendants
had few chances to confront witnesses in cross-examination. The
revisions aimed to change this situation by stipulating that witnesses
133
shall be present and subject to cross-examination during the trial.
The SPC's Interpretation, however, states that with the court's
permission, witnesses may be absent in the following four
circumstances:
a)

the witness is a minor;

b)

the witness is suffering from serious illness or is physically
incapable of being present at trial;

c)

the testimony of the witness will not affect the trial in a
significant way; or

d)

for other reasons.

134

Complaints that witnesses, especially those who provide
authorities with written testimonies, are seldom present for crossexamination were widespread among lawyers. Most witnesses are
exempted from presence at trial by a decision of the court, even when
lawyers have applied for their presence. In cases in which witnesses
are called by the court, many witnesses ignore the court order and
choose to stay away.
Although Chinese courts have subpoena powers, there is no legal
penalty for the failure to comply with a court's subpoena. In most
trials, the courts proceed only with written testimonies provided by
Lawyers are often left with the only option of
prosecutors.
impeaching the written testimony. 135 In all three trials the Author
observed, not a single witness was called. All the trials proceeded
with prosecutors and judges reading written evidence and lawyers
3 6
It
occasionally raising questions regarding the written testimony.'
to
to
conform
do
not
need
testimonies
that
written
should be noted
any formalities in which the opponent is given an opportunity to
question the witness.
Some authorities attribute the failure to bring witnesses to the
stand during trial to the ambiguity of the CPL because it does not
stipulate which side should be responsible for guaranteeing the

See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 47.
133.
134.
See Supreme People's Court, Guanyu Zhixing Zhonghu Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi [Interpretation on Several
Issues Regarding Implementation of the PRC CPL] on June 28, 1998, art. 141
[hereinafter SPC Interpretation].
See supra note 19.
135.
136.
Author's record of trial observation.
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presence of witnesses. One commentator insists that the laws or
regulations should provide the resources and legal guarantees that
can secure the presence of witnesses at trial. 13 7 Others suggest that
there should be an appropriate legal penalty if witnesses refuse to
attend. 138 Judges often cite safety concerns as an excuse for
139
witnesses not being called to the stand.
In any event, this reality severely prejudices the role of defense
lawyers and ultimately the rights of defendants. According to a
recent article concerning a total of 293 criminal cases tried in
Shenzhen courts from January to September 1997, only eighty-four
cases involved actual witness testimony. 140 In these cases, the courts
called a total of 129 witnesses to testify. 141 Only sixteen witnesses,
however, actually showed up. 142 Another report states that as few as
thirty percent of witnesses called by the courts were present at trial
during the period from January to April 1997 in the entire Wuhan
14 3
area.
Some scholars claim that the percentage of trials in which
witnesses are present is below ten percent. 144 Among 166 criminal
cases tried during the first quarter of 1997 in Maoming City,
Guangdong Province, there were only twelve cases in which witnesses
were present. 145 Shanghai's record was no better. From January to
April 1997, only five out of 107 criminal cases tried by Yangpu
District courts had witnesses take the stand. 146 Jingshan County
court had a better record, as witnesses were present in twenty-seven
percent of criminal cases during the first quarter of 1997.147
Some localities were worse than others. One survey conducted
by a district court in Henan province sheds some light on the severity

137.
Research Department of the High People's Court of Jiangsu, Xingshi
Susong Zhengren Chuting Ruogan Wenti De Tangtao [Discussion of Several Issues on
Witness' Presence in Criminal Trial], STUD. ADJUDICATION, No. 2, at 4-6 (1998).
138.
Li Yanhua and Zhou Changmiao, Guanyu Woguo Xingshi Zhengren
Chuting Zuozheng Zhidu De Sikao [Thoughts on Witness Testimony System in
Criminal Trial of Our Country], STUD. L. & COM., No. 4, at 84-85 (1999).
139.
Interview with Judges in Shanghai, Beijing, and Xian (July 1999).
140.
Cui Ming, Xingshi Susongfa Shishi Zhong De Wenti Yu Jianyi [Problems
and Solutions in Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law], XIANDAI FAxUE
[MOD. JURISPRUDENCE], No. 1, at 20-21 (1998).
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Qi Wenyuan et al., Xin Xingsufa Shishi Guocheng Zhong De Jige Wenti
[Several Problems with Implementation of the New Criminal Procedure Law],
FASHANG YANJIU [STUDY ON LAW AND COMMERCE], No. 6, at 77 (1997).
144.
Xiong Xuanguo, Guanche Xingsufa Gaige Shenpan Gongzuo [Implementing
the Criminal Procedure Law and Reforming Trial Work], Minzhu Yu Fazhi
[DEMOCRACY AND LAW], No. 17, at 26-28 (1997).
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 27.
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of the problem. Among 345 criminal cases tried by the People's Court
of Nanguan District, Kaifeng City, Henan Province, there were 1,726
witnesses who should have been called to the stand. 148 Of these, only
seven showed up in court.' 49 This roughly represents 0.4 percent of
150
all witnesses.
Professor Chen Guangzhong, China's leading criminal justice
expert, recently provided an even more pessimistic national
perspective. According to Professor Chen, witnesses are called to the
1
stand in only one to five percent of all criminal cases. 15 Witness
152
figures.
low
such
for
reason
safety appears to be the main
Prosecutors are also reluctant to call witnesses, however, because
they are concerned that the witnesses might retract their statements.
It is safer for prosecutors to rely on the favorable written statement.
or detained by
Other witnesses are simply afraid of being harassed
153
authorities if their testimony does not go well.
Attorneys and scholars in Shanghai and Beijing estimated that
the percentage of cases in which witnesses were called to the stand
and cross-examined was well below thirty percent, although the
situation has been steadily improving in big cities such as Shanghai
and Beijing. 15 4 All of them agreed that there was an urgent need to
enact a national law regulating the conduct of witnesses, including
with necessary resources and
provisions on providing witnesses
155
guarantees of personal safety.
G. The Risk of Representing Defendants in Criminal Cases
More pessimistically, lawyers in China can risk their careers and
even their personal liberty as a result of confrontations with
authorities in the course of representing their clients. The ACLA
declared 1995 as "a disaster year for lawyers" (lushi mengnan nian),
due to the high number of lawyers who were detained and convicted
for merely doing their job. 156 Since the new CPL became effective,
lawyers have been at an even greater risk than before. Lawyers are

Xingshi Susong Zhengren Yuanhe Nan Chuting [Criminal Trial, Why Is It
148.
So Hard to Call Witnesses], PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY, Apr. 23, 2000.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Interview with Professor Chen Guangzhong: The Verdict Should Be
151.
Invalidated Should the Key Witness Not Be Present, CHINA YOUTH DAILY (Aug. 25,
2000).
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Interviews with lawyers in Shanghai and Beijing (Apr. 1999).
154.
Id. For regulations on witnesses see Xiong Xuanguo, Guanche Xingsufa
155.
Gaige Shenpan Gongzuo [Implementing the Criminal Procedure Law and Reforming
Trial Work], MINZHUYU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY & L.], No. 17, at 27-28 (1997).
FANG CHONGYI ET AL., XINGSHI SUSONG
156.
COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 169 (1998).
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now more likely to come into conflict with authorities because the
new CPL provisions both expand the scope of their work at various
stages of the proceedings and allow lawyers to become involved
earlier in the process.
Mounting official hostility toward lawyers is another reason
lawyers are at more risk in China today. Public security departments
and prosecutors reportedly harass and intimidate lawyers. In the
worst cases, lawyers are detained, beaten up, or even convicted for
157
doing nothing more than vigorously representing their clients.
According to an MOJ official, in 1998 alone, more than one hundred
lawyers were detained, prosecuted, or convicted under a variety of
different charges. 158
According to another recent report, Hunan Province alone has
observed around 120 incidents since 1996 in which lawyers were
either harassed or had their liberty restricted since 1996.159 Among
these incidents, about twenty lawyers were detained or arrested on
various criminal charges. 160 In Fujian Province, three lawyers were
detained for allegedly tampering with evidence, suborning perjury, or
engaging in bribery in 1999.161 Further, the ACLA section in charge
of protecting lawyers' rights handled more than seventy cases in 1999
in which lawyers were deprived of their rights to defend their clients,
162
restricted from investigating cases, or harassed.
H. ProblematicLegal Provisions
Two troublesome clauses in Article 38 of the CPL potentially put
defense lawyers in severe professional jeopardy. 163 One clause states
that defense lawyers and other defenders are prohibited from
assisting criminal suspects or defendants in concealing, destroying, or
forging evidence and from helping defendants collude with each
other. 164 The other states that defense attorneys or other defenders
are prohibited from threatening or inducing witnesses to change their

157.
Lawyers

See Tian Wenchang, Lushi Weihe Buyuan Zuo Xingshi Bianhu? [Why Are
Not Willing to Engage in Criminal Defense?], JIANcHA RIBAO

[PROCURATORATE DAILY], Feb. 10, 1999, at 2.
158.
Id.

159.

Xiao Wenhui, Lushi Weiquan Lu Mangmang [Long Journey for Protecting

the Rights of Lawyer], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Oct. 25, 2000, at 11.

160.
Id.
161.
Fujian Lushi Shou Qingquan Shijian Yinqi Shehui Guanzhu [The
Incidences of Fujian Lawyers Being Violated Attracts Societal Attention] (Aug. 24,
2000) (China News Agency broadcast).
162.
Xinhua News Agency, Woguo Lushi Zhiye Huanjing Reng Xu Gaishang
[The Environment in which Our Country's Lawyers Are PracticingLaw Is Still Needed
to Be Improved Continuously] (May 21, 2000).
163.
164.

See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 38.
Id.
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testimony or commit perjury. 165 In addition, Article 306 of the
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China 166 provides that
defenders or legal representatives may be subject to punishment for
obstructing justice by forcing or inducing witnesses to commit perjury
167
or change their testimony.
Reports say that the hostility of officials towards lawyers has
become a major negative factor influencing the participation of
lawyers in the criminal process.
Commentators point out that
prosecutors have been unable to adjust to the new provisions of the
CPL concerning creating a more adversarial process in which
confrontations between lawyers and prosecutors are, to some extent,
legally required. Besides, prosecutors refuse to think of themselves
as being on an equal footing with defense lawyers. As one report puts
it:
Some public prosecutors could not come to terms with the fact that
lawyers are equal to them [in the court process]. A few even regard the
work of lawyers in legal defense as acts which help defendants evade
criminal punishment. It is not easy to change their mentality and
naturally this is reflected in their actions [seeking to blame
168
lawyers].
Another lawyer attributes hostile official attitudes to the revision
of the Lawyers Law, which redefines the role of lawyers as
"professionals providing legal service to society" (wei shehui tigong
fal fuwu de zhiye renyuan).169 Some people, he continues, believe
that there is no need to protect lawyers because they are no longer
170
"state legal workers" (guojia de falu gongzuozhe).
Many legal scholars have criticized the provisions of the CPL and
the Criminal Law (CL) on the crime of perjury by lawyers for creating
an environment that is unfriendly towards the provision of legal
counsel or defense services.17 1 One commentator pointed out that, as
defined in the CL, the crime of perjury or assisting perjury could be
committed by anyone involved in the criminal process, including
prosecutors or even judges. 172 The CL arbitrarily singles out defense

165.

Id.

166.
The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated on
July 1, 1979, and amended on March 14, 1997, by the National People's Congress.
Kelly A. Thomas, Falun Gong. An Analysis of China's National Security Concerns, 10
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 471, 472 (2001).
167.
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 306 (1996).
168.
Hou Shuxian, Lashi Ruhe Baohu Ziji [How Can Lawyers Protect
Themselves?], ZHONGGUO LOSHI [CHINESE LAW.], at 39 (1998).
169.
Art. 2.
170.
Li Shunyi, Lushi Canyu Xingshi Susong De Fengxian Jiqi Fangfang [Risks
and Why They Prevent Lawyers Participatingin Criminal Litigation], ZHONGGUO
LUSHI [CHINESE LAW.], No. 4, at 45 (1997).
171.
Id. at 46. Many lawyers and scholars we interviewed also criticized Article
38 of the CPL and Article 306 of the Criminal Law.
172.
Li Shunyi, supra note 170, at 45-46.
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attorneys and other defenders and thus exerts a great deal of
pressure on such lawyers.' 73 Furthermore, the CL does not stipulate
in detail what constitutes the crime of forging evidence or perjury
under Article 306, leaving prosecutors wide discretion to prosecute
lawyers and giving judges enormous latitude to find them guilty of
such an offense.
In practice, lawyers often run into serious legal trouble because
witnesses, defendants, or suspects change their testimony or
statements after lawyers become involved, thus prompting suspicion
174
After the
among prosecutors that lawyers have suborned perjury.
CPL took effect, there were many occurrences of witnesses and
defendants reversing their testimony and statements. 175 Some
lawyers have been convicted merely for acquiring a different story
from that given to officials.
For example, a perjury case in Jiangsu Province demonstrates
how a lawyer can be trapped under Article 306 of the Criminal Law.
Liu Jian was detained and prosecuted for illegally obtaining evidence,
which resulted in a retrial. 176 In fact, defense lawyer Liu simply
collected the full testimony of several witnesses and presented them
to the court. 177 One of the witnesses had apparently altered his
testimony from the original statement that he had given to the
authorities. 178 According to prosecutors, it was the defense attorney
who "induced" the witness to change the testimony; therefore, he
committed the crime of "defender impairing testimony" (bianhuren
fanghaizuozheng zui) under Article 306.179 The prosecutors relied on
two pieces of "evidence" in the indictment against Liu: first, the
witness' testimony was changed; and second, this change was the
result of Liu's "inducement."'18 0
Further, there is currently no judicial interpretation that
effectively distinguishes "inducement" from a "leading question"
(yindao xing fawen).181 Some commentators find the term "induce"

173.
174.

Id.
Interview with lawyers in Shanghai and Beijing (Apr. 1999).

Zou Gaoxiang et al., Zhengcha Jieduan Jieru Yi Ge Ling Lushi Ganga De
175.
Huati [Early Involvement in the Stage of Criminal Investigation: An Embarrassing
Topic for Lawyers], NANFANG DUSHI BAO [S. URB. DAILY], Aug. 29, 1998, at 21.
Elisabeth Rosenthal, China's Efforts to Overhaul Legal System Can Fall
176.
Short in Rural Areas, Young Lawyers Can Meet Resistance from Police, and Judges
and End up in Jail,PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 6, 2000.
Bianhu De Daijia [Report: The Cost of Defending], MINZHU YU FAZHI
177.
[DEMOCRACY & L.1, No. 22, at 7-9 (1998).
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Article 38 of the CPL uses the word of "induce." See 1996 CPL, supra note
181.
17, art. 38. By contrast, the term "leading question" is only a tactic to question
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used in Article 306 of the Criminal Law dangerously ambiguous. One
commentator argues that there could be many reasons why a witness
may give different testimonies at different times. One of the most
likely reasons is that the first statement, particularly if given by a
defendant, is false and obtained through torture. The mental
hostility of prosecutors towards lawyers, however, means that their
first inclination is to blame the lawyer. 182 A lawyer in Shanghai told
the Author that tension between defense attorneys and prosecutors is
often high. 8 3 Any rebuttal of the prosecutor's accusations, whether
challenging evidence or reasoning, could lead to potential trouble for
84
the lawyer.1
In another case in Tieling City, Liaoning, Province, Ren
Qingliang, a defense attorney in an arson case, was prosecuted for
perjury and harboring defendants. 185 Ren's only crime was that he
obtained testimony that gave the defendant an alibi and contradicted
the prosecutor's evidence. It was not until the defendant was
acquitted that Ren was set free.' 8 6 On some occasions, lawyers have
been held liable for the perjury of defendants. In Xinyang City,
prosecutors detained two lawyers after they discovered a false
statement, which was made by defendants rather than by the
87
lawyers.'
What troubles lawyers and legal scholars most is not that
lawyers can be detained or convicted for illegal acts, but rather that
they can be detained by their counterparts in a criminal trial while
they are in the middle of conducting legal defense. 188 This
undoubtedly sends a dangerous signal to all criminal lawyers that
they are working in the midst of legal uncertainty. Because their
opponents are the very ones who have the authority to determine
whether they are behaving appropriately in conducting their defense,
witness or defendant, which by no means could be incriminated as "induce," as many
lawyers argued. Interview with lawyers in Shanghai and Xian.
182.
See Wang Longtian, Zhengcha Jiguan Jujue Lushi Jieru Zhengcha
Huodong De Sikao [Thoughts on the Refusal of Crime Investigation Authorities to
Permit the Involvement of Lawyers in Crime Investigation Activities], GONGAN DAXUE
XUEBAO [J. PUB. SECURITY U.], No. 2, at 26-27 (1998).
183.
Interview with lawyers in Shanghai, P.R.C. (July 1999).
184.
Interview with lawyers in Shanghai, P.R.C. (June 1999).
185.
See Chen Qiulan, Lushi Wuzui Liaoning Sheng Lushi Ren QingliangBaobi
Zui An Beiwanglu [An Innocent Lawyer: Memorandum on the Crime of 'Harboring'
Committed by Ren Qingliang,A Lawyer from Liaoning Province], ZHONGGUO LUSHI
[CHINESE LAW.], No. 12, at 17-18 (1997).

186.

Id.

187.
Tian Xiuwen, Xin Xingsufa Shixing De Diyi Ge Gongzuo Ri FashengZai
Xinyang Shi De Juliu Lushi Shijian [The First Working Day after the New CPL
Entered into Effect: An Incident of Detaining Lawyers Occurred in Xinyang City],
FAZHI SHIJIE [WORLD LEGAL SYS.], No. 5, at 6 (1977). (The lawyers were released after
the intervention of members of the local people's congress.)
188.
All of these lawyers, including Liu Jian and Ren Qingliang, were arrested
immediately after the court recessed.
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there is a strong incentive for lawyers to be extremely conservative in
their work. As one lawyer stated, Article 306 of the Criminal Law
and Article 38 of the CPL are like the sword of Damocles hanging
over the heads of defense attorneys and other defenders, and nobody
189
knows when it will fall.
Lawyers have occasionally been prosecuted under the pretext of
other criminal charges, such as corruption or libel. In a recently tried
case in Harbin City, Heilongjiang Province, Sun Shaobo, the head of a
state-run law firm, was accused of the crime of graft because he
deposited legal service fees in his personal bank account. Although
he defended himself on the grounds that he was not state personnel
defined under Article 93 of the Criminal Law, and therefore could not
commit the crime of graft, the prosecutor insisted that he was on the
state payroll and should be considered a state worker. 190 Reports said
that Sun had previously offended prosecutors while defending
criminal cases, and there was suspicion that his trial was a form of
revenge by prosecutors. 191 In any event, lawyers have rarely been
charged with graft since the Lawyers Law redefined their role as
"professionals providing legal service for society" 192 and the new
Criminal Law clarified the conception of "state personnel" in 1997.19a
It would not be surprising if Sun's prosecution was motivated by
revenge because the crime of graft is one of the few in which
prosecutors have independent power to investigate (zizheng
anjian).194
Another highly-publicized case occurred in Lianhua County,
Jiangxi Province. He Xin, a well-regarded public defender with the
Center for Indigent People of the Jiangxi Province Academy of Social
Science, was sentenced to one-year's imprisonment for the crime of

Interview with lawyers in Shanghai and Beijing, P.R.C. (Apr. 1999).
189.
For details, see the report on this case, FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], June
190.
25, 1999, at 1. See also JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORATE DAILY], Apr. 7, 1999, at 4.
Id.
191.
The Lawyers Law, supra note 13, art. 2.
192.
Article 93 of the revised Criminal Law stipulates:
193.
The state personnel in this law refers to those assigned official duties in the
state organs. Those working in state-owned companies, enterprises, noncommercial units, as well as people's groups and assigned official duties, those
assigned specifically for official duties to state-owned companies, enterprises,
non-commercial units, as well as people's groups, and those by other legal
provisions assigned official duties, should be considered state personnel. The
critical term here is "assigned official duties."
Id. Sun was not assigned any official duty while working as a lawyer.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 18.
194.
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libel. 195 He Xin was accused by Li Chunting, the former president of
the People's Court of Lianhua County, on the grounds that he
circulated flyers accusing Li of illegal acts which the latter had firmly
196
denied.
There was a lot of skepticism about the impartiality of the trial.
First, He had a long history of agonizing the court by constantly
appealing cases on his clients' behalf. 197 Second, He had been critical
of the court president, including accusing him of corruption. 198 For
this reason, He was deprived of the right to represent clients in this
particular court for four years, despite the fact that there is no legal
basis for a court to bar a particular lawyer's representation in its
court. Finally, the trial involved many violations of legal procedure.
For example, the court president, as a plaintiff in a private criminal
lawsuit (xingshi zisu anjian), obtained the material accusing him of

corruption, which according to the relevant provisions should be
official secrets. 199
One recent case incriminating a lawyer further complicated the
climate in which lawyers are practicing criminal law. Yu Ping, a
criminal defense lawyer, was charged with "leaking state secrets" and
sentenced to one year of fixed-term imprisonment by a local court of
Henan Province on April, 28, 2001.200 Yu was the main defense
lawyer for a defendant in a corruption case. 20 1 She was accused of
inciting her associate to provide Zhu, the wife of her defendant, with
a copy of excerpted materials obtained from the court. 202 Zhu
allegedly studied the materials and arranged witnesses to provide
false testimonies in the later hearings. It is arguable that Yu, as a
defense lawyer, may have violated ethics rules by providing, via her
associate, the court documents to defendant's wife. 20 3 It is very
problematic, however, to incriminate her under the charge of secrecy

195.

See Yidou Chongchong De FaguanGao Lushi An [A Case in Which A Judge

Sued A Laywer Arouses Suspicions], NAFANG ZHOUMUO [S. WEEKEND], Jan. 22, 1999,

at 5.
196.
197.

Id. at 5.
Li complained that he always appealed whatever the judgment was. Id. at

198.
199.

Id.
Id.

6.
200.
Zhongguo Shouli Zaizhi Lushi Yin Xielou Guojia Mmi Bei Panxing [The
First Case in Which A Lawyer Was Sentenced for Leaking State Secrets in Our
Country], LEGAL DAILY, May 14, 2001, at 2. For the details of the case, see also Yin

Jianzhang, Zielu Guojia Mimi Zui: Quanguo Shouli Lushi Shexian Zielu Guojia Mimi
An Tingshen Jishi [The Crime of Leaking State Secrets: Tale of Adjudication of the
First Case of Leaking State Secrets by A Lawyer in Our Country], ZHONGGUO LUSHI
(CHINESE LAW.), No. 2001, at 39-42.
201.
Id. at 39.
202.
Id.
203.
According to lawyers interviewed in Shanghai and Xian, Chinese lawyers
are required not to provide materials to any body other than defendants. Interviews
with lawyers in Shanghai and Xian, P.R.C. (July 1999).
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violations. It is also not clear by which standard the court materials
were ascertained as "state secrets."
According to the official report, the justification for the charge
was that the materials transferred to defendant's wife made it
possible for the defendant's wife to conduct a series of "counteractions" including perjury against the authorities. 20 4 In turn, this
perjury caused the trial to be delayed twice and resulted in negative
influence in the locality. 20 5 It, however, is legal and important for
defendant and lawyer to have sufficient information and time to
prepare a defense.
Even according to Chinese law, all materials registered with the
20 6
courts should be fully accessible to defendants and their lawyers.
Why could the wife of the defendant-who has a vital interest in the
trial-not have access to such materials? There might be some
justifications for denying access by the wife or any other person to the
materials if those materials involved legitimate state secrets. The
materials in question, however, did not appear to be any sort of state
secret. Of course, Zhu's act to instigate perjury is certainly a crime
and punishable; nevertheless, it should not incriminate Yu, the
defense lawyer, in any way unless there is direct evidence suggesting
her commission of perjury too. Obviously in Yu's case, the court was
frustrated by the delays in trial and punished Yu for facilitating such
delays under the rubric of state secrecy violation.
The cases against lawyers mentioned above demonstrate why
lawyers are reluctant to be involved in criminal defense work, as well
as their unwillingness to confront the authorities. This situation
clearly damages the interest of defendants, and thus the aim of the
reformed CPL to provide more human rights protections.
I. The Reactions of Lawyers and the FutureImpact
Legal scholars generally insist that it is necessary for lawyers to
protect themselves in criminal litigation. Some suggest that at least
two lawyers should be present during the process of deposing
witnesses, which could prevent the authorities from incriminating
lawyers later if a witness changes his or her story. 207 To avoid
"inducing" defendants or suspects to change their statements, a

See Yin, supra note 200, at 39.
204.
Id.
205.
See 1996 CPL, supra note 17, art. 36.
206.
See Zhao Ziyun, Xingshi Anjian Zhong Lushi Tiqian Jieru Ruogan Wenti
207.
De Yanjiu [Studies on Several Issues of Lawyers' Early Involvement in the Criminal
Process], ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE LAW.], No. 12, at 13 (1997); see also Hou
Shuxiang, Lushi Ruhe Baohu Ziji [How Can Lawyers Protect Themselves], ZHONGGUO
LUSHI [CHINESE LAW.], No. 9, at 40 (1998).
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lawyer suggests:
There must be two lawyers present [while meeting with suspects]. The
record of the meeting must include the details of all the questions
posed by the lawyer and the legal advise they provide, and should be
to protect
signed by suspects. By so doing, lawyers will be able
208
themselves if the suspects later reverse their statements.

Even this careful approach, however, may not avoid problems
because lawyers do not have access to the prosecution's evidence
during the criminal investigation phase. Further, when lawyers meet
clients, they do not know what suspects have already told
prosecutors, which creates difficulties in identifying any changes in
testimony. Lawyers have to be extremely cautious when they have
conversations with their clients. Some lawyers we interviewed
insisted that they have to protect20 9 themselves not only from
prosecutors but also from their clients.
To avoid any possible legal trap, some propose that lawyers may
obtain testimony by letter (fa han diaocha quzheng) 210 or have
relevant people present whenever they depose witnesses. 211 One
lawyer proudly declared that he had sent out around thirty letters
and finally acquired a witness's written testimony. 212 Under such
circumstances, it is no wonder that the Model Practice for Lawyers'
Handling Criminal Cases (lashi banli xingshi anjianguifang), issued
by the All China Lawyers Association on April 25, 1998, states that
lawyers may invite relevant people to be present during
documentation of the evidence with witnesses (quzheng).213
The hostile environment and the frequent reports about lawyers
being caught up in serious legal problems have greatly discouraged
lawyers from participating in criminal defense and have caused a
substantial decline in the number of criminal cases in which
defendants are represented by lawyers. 2 14 To protect the rights of
lawyers and ensure that defendants can be adequately represented in
criminal trials, the ACIA passed the Rules on the Committee of

208.
See Zhao, supra note 208, at 13.
209. Interviews with lawyers in Shanghai and Beijing, P.R.C. (July 1999).
Lushi Zuotan Xingshi Bianhu Nandian Jiaodian Ji Redian [Lawyer's
210.
Symposium: Difficulties, Focuses, as well as Hot Issues in CriminalDefense], LUSHI Yu
FAZHI [LAW. & LEGALITY], No. 10, at 38 (1997) [hereinafter The Report on Lawyer's
Symposium].
See Deng Ruixiang, Lushi Ying Qianghua Ziwo Baohu Yishi [Lawyers
211.
Should Raise Their Awareness of Self-protection], ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINESE LAW.],
No. 5, at 37 (1997).

See Symposium, supra note 63, at 38.
212.
See Lushi Banli Xingshi Anjian Guifang, [All China Lawyer Association:
213.
Model Practice for Lawyers' Handling Criminal Cases] [hereinafter the ACLA Model
Practice], issued on April 25, 1998, art. 49.
214.
See Tian Wenchang, Lushi Weihe Buyuan Zuo Xingshi Bianhu? [Why Are
Lawyers Not Willing to Engage in Criminal Defense], JIANcHA RIBAO
[PROCURATORATE DAILY], Feb. 10, at 2 (1999).
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Safeguarding Lawyer's Legal Rights During Practicing Law 215
(Safeguarding Rules) and formally established a sub-committee on
safeguarding lawyers' rights in March 1998.216
According to the Safeguarding Rules, ACLA and its local
subordinates should establish a sub-committee to deal with cases
regarding violations of lawyers' legal rights and interests. 217
Although the sub-committees were expected to take a strong.position
on protecting lawyers, it appears that they only publicize cases and
exert influence over the local government in order to rescue the
218
lawyers in trouble.

IV.

CONCLUSION:

AN

UPHILL JOURNEY

Universally recognized international standards require that all
persons facing a criminal charge, including suspects or defendants, be
adequately represented by legal counsel. 2 19 For instance, Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
requires that all persons "have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his
own choosing. '220 Furthermore, the Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers (Principles on Lawyers) stipulates:
All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with
adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by and to
communicate and consult with a lawyer, without delay, interception or
censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be
within sight, but not within the hearing, of law enforcement
22 1
officials.

215.
The Rules on Committee of Safeguarding Lawyer's Legal Rights During
Practicing Law was passed by the ACLA Standing Committee at its Eighth Meeting of
the Third Congress on Nov. 22, 1997.
216.
See Special Report, We Are Walking in the Broad Road-Interview with
Ren Jishen, President of the Third Congress of All China Lawyer Associations,
PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 21, 1999, at 11.
217.
See supra note 215.
218.
Article 3 of the Safeguarding Rules stipulates the mandate of the
committee as "coordinating .... aiding ... proposing ... to solve the issue with other
governmental department."
219.
The Human Rights Committee has stated that "all persons who are
arrested must immediately have access to counsel." (Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee, Georgia, UN Doc. CCPRIC/79 Add. 75, 27 Apr. 1 (1997)).
220.
China signed the ICCPR in October 1998, but has not yet ratified the
treaty. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
221.
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, in Human Rights: A Compilation
of International Instruments, Vol. I. (Passed at the Eighth U.N. Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 119.)
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More specifically, suspects are entitled to: (1) retain a lawyer
upon arrest or upon being charged with a criminal offence; 222 (2) have
prompt access to the lawyer of their choosing, usually no later than
forty-eight hours from the time of arrest or detention; 223 and (3) their
communications
with lawyers should be effected in full
224
confidentiality.
The Principles on Lawyers advises that legal counsel should be
ensured the following conditions: (1) they should be able to perform
all of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance,
harassment, or improper interference; 225 (2) they should not suffer
any punishment for any actions taken in accordance with their
duties; 226 (3) they should have access to appropriate information,
files, and documents in the government's control or possession; 227 and
(4) the confidentiality of all communications and consultations with
228
their clients should be respected.
By repeatedly allowing its public security departments and local
procuratorates to deny requests for attorney-client meetings, China
has obviously failed to "ensure that all persons arrested or detained..
. have prompt access to a lawyer. '229 By neglecting to protect defense
attorneys from arbitrary detention or conviction, China has also failed
to uphold the guarantee that lawyers "shall not suffer, or be
threatened with, prosecution or administrative ... or other sanctions
for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional
duties."230 By turning a blind eye to the difficulties lawyers currently
face in preparing a defense, China overlooks its duty "to ensure
lawyers access to appropriate information, files and documents ... to
231
enable lawyers to provide effective legal assistance to their clients."
Although the Principles on Lawyers is not formally binding, it
reflects widely accepted standards on the components of the right to a
fair trial. In addition, China is obligated to uphold the right to a fair
trial.232 Indeed, the effective assistance of legal counsel obviously
affects an individual's ability to present a defense of criminal charges
filed against him. Although the current CPL provides for a greater
role for lawyers in the criminal process, the environment in which
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1966, art. 14(3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Art. 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III),
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lawyers work remains highly unsatisfactory
according
to
international norms.
In sum, the revision of the CPL in 1996 seemingly represents a
progress reflecting a series of enlightened measures accumulating
during the past two decades of legal reform. Both the legal culture
and the political reality, however, have undermined this critical
reform a great deal. Efforts have been made by legal scholars,
lawyers, and reform-minded officials at various occasions to voice
their concerns and urge for improvements. There is indeed some
initiatives that have been raised by different authorities in various
areas, such as on-going drafting of the evidence law by the Standing
Committee of National People's Congress, which would certainly
improve the chance of defense lawyers to cross-examine witnesses at
trial. 233 Some local courts or procuratorates continue to experiment
with devices allowing a limited right to remain silent for suspects and
defendants.
Information revealed from one recent national
conference 23 4 with regard to criminal defense lawyers provides us
with a very positive prospect. Nevertheless, there is no sign that any
major significant reforms will be launched any time soon.
Many lawyers and scholars 15lame the political structure for the
current problems hindering lawyers, and therefore suspects and
defendants, from exercising their procedural rights. Recently, a
professor from Beijing University voiced his concern that any
progressive reform could not be put to work without reforming the
fundamental system. "[W]ithout overhauling
current power
structure," he said, "without achieving certain degree of judicial
independence and freedom of media or press, those beautiful words
contained in the current CPL would never come true." 23 5 Many
scholars echo his concern. It is indeed the overall political structure
that should be blamed most for the failure of the CPL revision in 1996.
In the contemporary power structure, the Chinese judiciary has
a lower status than other organizations, such as prosecutors and

233.
Some local courts have long been experimenting on evidence rules. For
example, the High People's Court of Beijing issued comprehensive interim rules
regarding handling of evidence by the courts, which was set to take effect on October 1,
2001. Article 21 explicitly requires that all witnesses but those otherwise legally
excused be present at trial to be cross-examined.
234.
The Conference was held in a suburb of Beijing on December 8-9, 2001.
The Author was invited to the conference and was astonished by the openness and
honesty of the participants. Lawyers openly criticized the prosecutors and public
security personnel for creating obstacles for lawyers to participate in criminal defense.
It was to the Author's surprise that senior prosecutors attending the conference
frankly admitted such difficulties, expressed their sympathies, and vowed to improve,
in spite of criticism.
235.
See a speech by a professor from Beijing University Law School on the
Conference on Justice and Criminal Defense in Beijing, Dec. 12-13, 2001 (on file with
the Author).
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public security departments. In most cases, the presidents of People's
Courts enjoy less political influence than the chief prosecutors and
the chief of public security departments within the party system. In
addition, there is a political-legal committee set up within every CCP
committee that is supposed to coordinate the party's legal policy as
well as help with the appointment of legal personnel such as the
president of the court and chief prosecutor.2 3 6 On many occasions,
the political-legal committee might interfere with the work of the
judiciary, if it deems such interference necessary. The difficulties
that Chinese criminal defense lawyers have run into are mostly
related to this political structure.
Professional lawyers are likewise not able to practice
independently. The Ministry of Justice and its local subordinates
have authority to "manage" lawyers. 237 The way to "manage" lawyers
includes organizing lawyers to study the legal policy of the
government and the party and overseeing the lawyers' work.
Compared to their counterparts in the court, lawyers lack the
resources and power to safeguard their own liberty and interests.
With the recent entry into the WTO, China certainly needs to
renovate its legal system in order to integrate into the world system.
The question, however, is whether China will be able to be
internationalized only at the business level without touching its
political structure. Many remain skeptical. It is very hard to imagine
that WTO rules, which are indeed closely related to trade acts, will be
enforced fairly by a highly politically biased legal system.
Many believe that the upcoming CCP's National Congress will
decide the direction of China's political reform for the next few years,
even decade. Few, however, foresee radical changes or immediate
effects of any dramatic reforms.
To criminal defense lawyers,
improving their practicing situations without seriously reforming the
current system means merely a rocky road ahead. The humorous
words of a leading scholar given to a recent conference may well
reflect the mentality of most criminal defense lawyers: "Let's hope the
238
best but prepare for the worst."
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See Human Rights in China: Empty Promise: Human Rights Protection
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